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Financialisation, or the search for profits 
in the sphere of circulation
Financialisation of advanced capitalist economies during the last three decades represents expansion 
of the sphere of circulation, while the sphere of production has continued to face difficulties of 
profitability and productivity growth. In the course of financialisation, relations between industrial/
commercial capital, banks and workers have been put on a different footing. The financial sector has 
become capable of extracting profit directly out of wages and salaries, a process called financial 
expropriation. Financial institutions have also become adept at profit-making through mediating 
transactions in open financial markets, that is, investment banking. The combination of financial 
expropriation and investment banking catalysed the crisis that began in 2007.
La financiarización de las economías capitalistas avanzadas durante las últimas tres décadas rep-
resenta la expansión en la esfera de la circulación, mientras la esfera de la producción ha continu-
ado enfrentándose a dificultades en el crecimiento de la rentabilidad y la productividad. En el 
transcurso de la financiarización las relaciones entre el capital industrial/comercial, los bancos y 
los trabajadores se han reconfigurado en perjuicio de estos últimos. El sector financiero ha conse-
guido extraer beneficios directamente del capital industrial/comercial y de los salarios, un proceso 
denominado “expropiación financiera”. Las instituciones financieras se han hecho adeptas a la 
obtención de beneficios procedentes de la intermediación de transacciones en mercados financie-
ros abiertos, ésto es, la banca de inversión. La combinación de la expropiación financiera y la ban-
ca de inversión son los catalizadores de la crisis que comenzó en 2007.
Ekonomia kapitalista aurreratuen azken hiru hamarkadetako finantzarizazioak zirkulazioaren eremuan 
izandako hedapena azaltzen du; aldiz, ekoizpenaren eremuak errentagarritasunaren eta produktibi�
tatearen hazkuntzan egondako zailtasunei aurre egiten jarraitu du. Finantzarizazioa egon bitartean, 
kapital industrial/komertzialaren, bankuen eta langileen arteko harremanak azken horien kalterako 
birkonfiguratu dira. Finantza�sektoreak zuzenean eskuratu ahal izan ditu onurak kapital industrial/ko�
mertzialetik eta soldatetatik; prozesu horrek “finantza�desjabetzea” du izena. Finantza�erakundeak 
finantza�merkatu irekietako transakzioen bitartekotzatik —hau da, inbertsio�bankutik— eratorritako 
onurak eskuratzearen jarraitzaile egin dira. Finantza�desjabetzearen eta inbertsio�bankaren nahas�
keta da 2007an hasi zen krisiaren katalizatzailea.
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1.  ANALYSING FINANCIALISATION: 
APPROACH AND METHOD
Financialisation has attracted much 
interest among political economists in 
recent years, and even more as the crisis of 
2007-9 began to unfold. There is no 
commonly agreed use of the term, though it 
certainly refers to the extraordinary growth 
of finance during the last two to three 
decades. Several analytical approaches to 
financialisation can be found in the literature, 
some of which are selectively mentioned 
below. Despite their differences, these 
approaches have a common thread, namely 
to associate financialisation with a change 
in the balance between production and 
circulation. That is the point of departure for 
this article.
Much of the or iginal insight into 
financialisation came from the Marxist work 
of the Monthly Review current, guided by 
Sweezy and Magdoff, who began to draw 
attention to the growth of finance already in 
the 1970s.  1 For  Sweezy (1997) , 
financialisation is due to the transformation 
of capitalist accumulation commencing at 
the end of the nineteenth century. 
Financialisation is one of three underlying 
trends of capitalist development in the 
twentieth century, together with the slowing 
down of the rate of growth and the rise of 
monopolistic multinationals. There is a clear 
rationale for financialisation within the 
framework developed by Baran and Sweezy 
in Monopoly Capital (1966). Namely, in 
mature capitalism, the sphere of production 
is incapable of absorbing as new investment 
the ever expanding surplus generated by 
monopolies. Production therefore stagnates 
and capital seeks refuge in circulation, 
particularly in the speculative activities of 
finance. 
1 See Magdoff and Sweezy (1987). Bellamy Foster 
(2007, 2008) offers a clear account of the use and 
meaning of the term for Monthly Review. Pollin (2004) 
has  lauded Sweezy ’s  ear l y  awareness  o f 
financialisation, acknowledging his own debt to it. 
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Sweezy and Magdoff’s observation of 
the changing balance between production 
and circulation is particularly prescient in 
view of the relative neglect of finance in the 
corpus of the current’s economic work, 
including in Monopoly Capital. The impact 
of their argument – direct or indirect – can 
be discerned among political economists, 
Marxist and other. For, the argument does 
not ultimately hinge on the theory of the 
ever-expanding surp lus inundat ing 
production. Rather, it is consistent with 
several theories that identify persistent 
malfunctioning in the sphere of production. 
It is not surprising that the idea that capital 
has escaped in circulation as production 
stumbled in the mid-1970s has become 
common currency among heterodox 
economists.
This notion, for instance, is present - if at 
times tacitly - in the work of Crotty (1990), 
Pollin (2007), and Epstein (2005). Moreover, 
for these writers financialisation is also 
associated with the re-emergence of the 
rentier, which exacerbates the malaise of 
production. Financial profits have grown at 
the expense of industrial profits and rentiers 
are a deadweight on industrial capitalists. 
Consequently, financialisation has induced 
poor performance in investment, output 
and growth in developed countries in recent 
years. Considerable empirical research in 
this vein has emerged recently. 2 This work 
overlaps with post-Keynesian analysis of 
t h e  p r o b l e m a t i c  m a c r o e c o n o m i c 
implications of ‘finance-led accumulation’.3
Yet, from a very different Marxist 
perspective, Brenner (2002) also shares the 
notion that capital has sought refuge in 
2 Notably Stockhammer (2004) and Orhangazi 
(2008).
3 See Hein, Niechoj, Spahn and Truger (2008).
circulation as production stagnated. 
Brenner, whilst avoiding financialisation as 
an organising category, certainly suggests 
that financial activities in circulation have 
grown as a direct response to profitability 
problems in the sphere of production. The 
Marxist analysis of Dumenil and Levy 
(2004), on the other hand, also emphasises 
the intensified search for profits in the 
sphere of f inance as profitabi l i ty in 
production has remained problematic and 
neoliberalism took hold.
From a still different, and much broader, 
historical perspective, the same notion is 
the basis of Arrighi’s (1994) analysis of 
financialisation. Ranging over centuries, 
Arrighi essentially argues that finance and 
c i rcu lat ion thr ive when product ion 
stagnates. For him, f inancial isat ion 
represents autumn in the long-term, cyclical 
alternation of dominant capitalist formations. 
Arrighi’s work is one of the motivations of 
Krippner’s (2005) thorough empirical study 
of financialisation of the US economy. 
Krippner established the rising importance 
of f inancial prof its for non-f inancial 
corporations during the last five decades.
In a related way the idea that circulation 
has expanded and thrived as production 
entered a period of trouble is also present 
in the recent work of the Regulation School. 
4 In a nutshell, as Fordism disintegrated, the 
search for a new regime of regulation 
moved into the sphere of finance. The new 
regime has begun to emerge through 
financial markets, particularly the stock 
exchange. The regulationist approach 
chimes with the voluminous work on 
changes in corporate governance since the 
1970s. ‘Shareholder value’ and the 
4 See Aglietta (2000), Boyer (2000) and Aglietta and 
Breton (2001). See also Grahl and Teague (2000).
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associated short-termism of corporate 
enterprises have been extensively analysed 
and documented by political economists, 
business school writers, and economic 
sociologists.5
The crisis of 2007-9 has confirmed the 
emphasis laid by political economists on 
financialisation since it has emanated in the 
sphere of finance and spread to production 
partly through financial mechanisms. But 
the crisis has also presented unexpected 
developments shedding fresh light on 
financialisation and inviting a rethink of the 
relationship between production and 
circulation. Thus, its proximate causes are 
to be found in sub-prime lending in the USA 
which was exacerbated by f inancial 
engineering within the financial sector. It is 
unprecedented for a crisis of this magnitude 
to spring out of financial transactions 
involving the poorest sections of the 
working class. Moreover, its global spread 
is due, in the first instance, to securitisation 
associated with the adoption of investment 
banking functions by commercial banks. In 
short, financialisation in the 2000s has been 
closely related to the personal revenue of 
workers, while entailing a transformation of 
banking. The combination of the two has 
proven lethal for both finance and the 
productive sector.
A Marxist approach that is aware of 
these aspects of the current crisis can offer 
fresh insight into financialisation. As Sweezy 
and Magdoff noted, the balance between 
production and circulation has shifted in 
favour of the latter; however, the causes of 
the shift have to be reconsidered in terms 
5 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) are particularly 
insightful. Shareholder value has been extremely 
prominent in the work of the CRESC group on 
financialisation, see Savage and Williams (2008) for 
recent work on financialisation and elites.
o f  t he  f undamen ta l  r e l a t i ons  o f 
accumulation. It is shown below that the 
deeper roots of financialisation are to be 
found in the elemental relations among key 
economic entities of capitalist accumulation, 
namely industr ia l  (and commercia l ) 
enterpr ises, workers,  and f inancia l 
institutions. In this light, and still more 
broadly, financialisation is due to changes in 
the forces and relations of production, 
combined with the transformation of the 
institutional and legal framework of capitalist 
accumulation in recent years.
The approach to f inancia l isat ion 
proposed in this paper is explicitly informed 
by the classical Marxist debates on 
imperialism and finance capital at the turn 
of the twentieth century. At issue was the 
transformation of capitalism during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Summarily 
put, giant monopolistic corporations had 
emerged, often organised as cartels that 
operated exclusive trading zones. Global 
finance, dominated by monopolistic banks, 
was on the ascendant. At the same time, 
British predominance in world markets was 
challenged by Germany and the USA. The 
political counterpart of these underlying 
trends was militarism and imperialism 
among the main powers.
Several Marxist theories contested the 
explanation of these phenomena, but 
Hilferding’s (1981) analysis stood out. 
Hilferding, as is well known, argued that the 
transformation of capitalism was due to the 
rise of finance capital. This is an amalgam 
of industrial and banking capital created as 
m o n o p o l i s t i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s  c o m e 
increasingly to rely on banks for investment 
finance. Finance capital is led by banks and 
‘organises’ the economy to suit its interests, 
thus resulting in exclusive trading blocs and 
the export of money capital. Consequently, 
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finance capital seeks to establish empire by 
mobilising political and military help from the 
state. Lenin (1964) took Hilferding’s 
analysis, added ‘parasitical rentiers’ and 
greater emphasis on monopoly, and 
produced the definitive Marxist theory of 
imperialism in the twentieth century.
It is apparent that Hilferding’s theory in 
its original form fits poorly the phenomena 
of contemporary capitalism. But for several 
reasons his theoretical thrust is sound, and 
can be a guide to analysis of financialisation. 
6 First, Hilferding seeks the causes of the 
great transformation of his time in the 
fundamental relations of accumulation, 
rather than in policy or institutional change. 
Specifically, he claims that as the size of 
production grows, monopolies come to 
depend heavily on investment credit by 
banks. In his view this entails a closer 
relationship between banks and industry, 
and thus emergence of finance capital. 
Second, Hilferding is fully aware of the 
organ isat iona l  impl icat ions of  th is 
development. Thus, finance capital rests on 
dense connections between finance and 
industry through interlocking appointments, 
exchange of information, and joint decision 
making.
Third, despite focusing on the rise of 
finance, Hilferding never opts for the 
opposition between ‘active’ industrialist and 
‘idle’ financier. There is no suggestion in his 
theory of rentiers pressing on industrial 
capitalists and lowering investment rates, or 
rates of growth. Rather, finance capital is an 
amalgam, and hence industrial capital has a 
direct interest in the profitability of financial 
operations. Fourth, imperialism is not an 
6 Bearing in mind that Hilferding’s brief analysis of 
the sphere of production is grounded on inadequate 
empirical evidence. 
arbitrary outcome of political choices but 
has roots in economic processes. By the 
same token, imperialism has a specific 
historical content and is not the result of, 
say ,  a  human propens i t y  toward 
aggrandisement and domination of others.
To be sure Hilferding also treats some 
economic phenomena perfunctorily, while 
overplaying his hand in other respects. 
Thus, his view that large monopolies 
increas ing ly  depend on banks for 
investment finance is simply incorrect, and 
probably the result of focusing excessively 
on the German and Austrian economies of 
his time. Similarly, the notion that finance 
capital ‘organises’ the economy is far-
fetched, and fits badly with the gigantic 
crises that took place in the 1920s and 
1930s. Lenin was more careful on this 
score. Nonetheless, Hilferding’s approach 
and results were path-breaking and a 
model for analysis of financialisation.
For, financialisation has evident analogies 
with the transformation of capitalism at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Multinational 
corporations currently dominate the world 
economy; finance is again on the ascendant 
g lobal ly;  capita l  export  has grown 
substantially; a certain type of imperialism 
has reasserted itself. At the same time, 
there is no fusion of banks with industry; 
banks are certainly not dominant over 
industry; and there are no exclusive trading 
zones closely related to territorial empires. 
Nonetheless, the present per iod is 
characterised by the interpenetration of 
finance with industry and, more broadly, of 
finance with workers’ activities, making 
Hilferding’s work an indispensable analytical 
tool.
In the rest of this article financialisation is 
discussed on this basis, while drawing on 
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recent theoretical and empirical work. 7 It is 
shown that financialisation is rooted in 
changes in the molecular relations between 
industrial and financial capitals in the first 
instance. To be specific, large industrial and 
commercial corporations have become less 
reliant on banks for finance. Open financial 
markets have grown and corporations have 
become ‘financialised’ in the sense of 
acquiring financial assets as well as issuing 
traded financial liabilities.
Consequently, financial institutions have 
been forced to change in profound ways 
during the last three decades. Two among 
these changes stand out: first, banks have 
turned toward individual income as source 
of profits and, second, banks have adopted 
investment banking methods generating 
profits through fees, commissions and 
trading on own account. The former is 
based on the financialisation of workers’ 
revenue in general. Workers have become 
heavily implicated in the activities of the 
formal financial system both in terms of 
borrowing (mortgages and consumption) 
but also in terms of assets (pensions and 
insurance). These developments owe much 
to the withdrawal of public provision across 
goods and services comprising the real 
wage: housing, health, education, pensions, 
and so on.  F inanc ia l  ins t i tu t ions, 
consequently, have been able to extract 
profits directly and systematically out of 
wages and salaries. This process is called 
financial expropriation.
Financialisation has certainly involved a 
search for profits in the sphere of circulation. 
However, this has been a structural and 
deeply-rooted process, as is shown in the 
7 See, above all, the special issue of Historical 
Materialism on financialisation, namely Lapavitsas 
(2009), Dymski (2009) and Dos Santos (2009).
rest of this article. It should finally be noted 
here that financialisation has also witnessed 
changes in the institutions and mechanisms 
of economic policy-making, including the 
central bank. Moreover, financialisation has 
entailed a transformation of international 
finance - typically related to the role of the 
dollar as world money - which has affected 
power and surplus transfer relations 
globally. These developments are beyond 
the scope of this article, which focuses on 
the underlying domestic aspects of 
financialisation.
Section 2 below considers financialisation 
in terms of the balance between production 
and circulation. Particular attention is paid 
to technological change and its impact on 
productivity. Section 3 then turns to the 
economic content of financialisation and 
considers, first, relations between financial 
institutions and industrial/commercial 
corporations, second, the turn of financial 
institutions toward workers’ revenue and, 
third, the turn of financial institutions toward 
mediating activities in open financial 
markets. Section 4 concludes.
2.  FINANCIALISATION AND THE 
CHANGING BALANCE BETWEEN 
PRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION
2.1.  Asymmetry in the development of 
production and circulation
In some respects the financialisation of 
major developed countries during the last 
three decades is apparent to the point of 
triviality. The financial sector has grown 
relative to the rest of the economy, including 
with regard to labour employed; financial 
assets have become a large part of the 
assets of non-financial corporations; 
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ind iv idua l  bor row ing fo r  hous ing , 
consumption, education, and health has 
grown substantially, as have individual 
assets held for pensions, insurance and so 
on; global financial markets have become 
increasingly integrated; international money 
and  cap i t a l  f l ows  have  r eached 
unprecedented levels. The list could be 
easily extended.
Simply and summarily put, the sphere of 
circulation (particularly the financial sector) 
has exhibited more dynamism than the 
sphere of production since the 1970s. There 
is little doubt that the productive sector of 
developed countr ies has performed 
indifferently during this period, as is 
manifested in consistently lower rates of 
growth compared to the pre-1973 period. 
An asymmetry appears to have developed 
within developed capitalist economies 
between sluggish production and vigorous 
circulation, particularly booming finance. 
While the particular characteristics of the 
asymmetry vary across developed countries 
(as well as across developed and developing 
countries) its presence is not in doubt.
This asymmetry is fundamental to 
financialisation and forms a natural starting 
point for its analysis. What are the reasons 
of i ts emergence? From a Marxist 
perspective, if the balance between the 
constituent spheres of the capital ist 
economy has altered significantly, the 
deeper causes must be sought in 
developments in the forces and relations of 
production. These would account for 
differential growth patterns in production 
and circulation, including the appearance of 
new fields of profitability.
In this light, the roots of financialisation 
during the last three decades are to be 
found, on the one hand, in the technological 
r e v o l u t i o n  i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d 
telecommunications and, on the other, in 
the deregulation of labour and financial 
markets, with the attendant intensification 
of labour. These underlying material factors 
appear to have impacted on the sphere of 
circulation, including finance, with particular 
force. Establishing and analysing their 
workings in historical detail is, of course, a 
gigantic task, far beyond the scope of this 
article. But some insight on the impact of 
technological change can be gleaned from 
the trajectory of the growth of the 
productivity of labour during this period. 
This is discussed in section 2.2, while the 
impact of deregulation is briefly considered 
in section 2.3.
2.2.  Technological change and 
productivity growth 
Productivity has continued to rise in the 
USA, Japan and the other developed 
countries since the mid-1970s. However, 
the dynamism of capitalist expansion 
depends on the rate of growth of 
productivity. In this respect, the asymmetry 
between production and circulation in 
recent decades has to do with the unstable 
rate of growth of productivity, and therefore 
wi th the nature of  the under ly ing 
technological change.
But before discussing this point, there 
are conceptual problems to confront. 
Productivity in the sphere of production is a 
straightforward concept (physical output 
per worker) and depends on technological 
progress, labour skills, the organisation of 
production, and so on. Productivity in the 
sphere of circulation, on the other hand, is 
far more problematic. Enterprises that 
spec ia l ise in  c i rcu lat ion are of ten 
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intermediaries (for instance, financial 
institutions) and hence do not produce 
output. Furthermore, from a Marxist 
perspective, they typically do not produce 
value.
The absence of value creation in 
circulation is not directly relevant to 
measuring productivity, since the latter is 
about physical output per worker. However, 
lack of value creation limits the economic 
impact of productivity growth within the 
sphere of circulation. Productivity growth is 
ultimately important because it changes the 
value of output per unit, and therefore 
affects costs and profitability across the 
economy. Nonetheless, intermediaries that 
engage in circulation have a measurable 
volume of activities, both on and off the 
balance sheet. They also employ large 
numbers of staff that take up the bulk of 
costs. Hence a measure of the volume of 
activities relative to workers employed 
would still be a valuable indication of how 
intermediaries mobilise resources.
These conceptua l  prob lems are 
compounded by intractable difficulties of 
measurement, since productivity refers to 
quantitative aggregates of use values. But 
these well-known problems are not a direct 
concern of this paper. It suffices for our 
purposes to refer to mainstream productivity 
measures, irrespective of the methodology 
used. In this respect, even Total Factor 
Productivity, a notoriously problematic, 
residual measure of productivity, can be of 
use. If it was systematically applied over 
time, even Total Factor Productivity would 
still give a sense of the dynamism of change 
of productivity.8
8 The methodology of measuring productivity has 
changed significantly in the USA during the last two 
decades with the adoption of ‘hedonic indices’, which 
In this vein, mainstream literature has 
shown that productivity growth for the 
economy as a whole has been deficient 
since the late 1970s across developed 
countries. Manufacturing productivity 
growth has been weak but productivity in 
services has been even weaker. The USA 
during the short period from the late 1990s 
to the early 2000s is a partial exception. 9 
However, in the course of the bubble of 
2001-7 labour productivity growth appears 
to have declined again in the USA. 10 It is 
important to note that productivity growth 
has also been problematic in finance. Poor 
productivity growth in finance fits well with 
the literature that directly examines the 
costs of banks, which has shown that 
financial intermediaries have been inefficient 
in recent years. 11 In short, new technologies 
and associated labour practices have failed 
to set the capitalist economy on a path of 
systematic and rapid productivity growth, 
including in finance, during the last three 
decades.
Quite why this should be is unclear but it 
evidently has to do with the nature of 
informat ion and te lecommunicat ion 
technologies as well as the work practices 
that  they enforce and encourage. 
Irrespective of the reasons for it, hesitant 
productivity growth does not make for 
dynamic expansion in the sphere of 
production. In the long term, productivity 
gains drive down costs, leading to increases 
in (relative) surplus value and thus expanded 
are deeply unsatisfactory. But that again does not 
matter for the purposes of this article.
9 The literature is extensive. See, very selectively, 
Gordon (1999), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner 
and Sichel (2000), Triplett and Bosworth (2003).
10 The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (various) has 
reported a consistently declining rate of growth of 
labour productivity since 2002.
11 See Berger and Mester (1997), (2003).
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cap i ta l i s t  accumula t ion .  Med iocre 
productivity growth in recent decades is 
associated with the indifferent performance 
of the productive sector, including weak 
profitability. Strengthening profitability in the 
sphere of production during the last three 
decades appears to have relied heavily on 
keeping real wages stagnant whi le 
intensifying labour, thus allowing capitalists 
to reap the benefits of whatever increases 
in productivity have taken place. Restored 
profitability has not resulted from dynamic 
improvements in productivity through 
technological progress.
At the same time, the impact of new 
technologies on the sphere of finance has 
been dramatic. Finance might have become 
neither more efficient nor more productive 
in terms of intermediation per worker, but it 
has become capable of operations that 
were previously completely impossible. The 
changes are apparent in terms of the 
internal organisation of financial institutions, 
the speed of transactions, the feasibility of 
financial engineering, the links between 
financial markets, the techniques of pricing 
and risk management, and so on. 12 Not 
least, finance has become technically 
capable of dealing with huge numbers of 
individual borrowers.
These changes lie at the core of the 
asymmetry between production and 
circulation. Against a background of 
hesitant productivity growth, and spurred 
by new technology and associated labour 
practices and skills, the sphere of finance 
has been able to expand faster than 
production. In doing so, finance has 
generated new sources of profitability for 
the capitalist class as a whole. These new 
avenues of profit-making are a vital feature 
12 Discussed in Lapavitsas and Dos Santos (2008).
of financialisation, and are particularly 
important in the context of sluggish 
productivity growth.
2.3. Deregulation
The forces and relations of production do 
not operate in a vacuum but rather within 
complex institutional, political, customary 
and other mechanisms. These are ‘external 
conditions through whose channel capitalist 
development flows’, to use Trotsky’s (1923) 
pithy phrase. 13 For financialisation this 
‘channel’ was set by the profound 
institutional and legal transformations 
associated with neo-liberalism since the late 
1970s. Two among these stand out.
The first is the deregulation of labour 
markets, with an associated shift in the 
balance of power against organised labour. 
Deregulation of labour includes reduced 
protection of employment with parallel use 
of unemployment as disciplining device. 
The composition of the labour force has 
also changed through entry of part-time 
workers and women, the two often being 
the same. Flexible employment, invasion of 
private time by work, unpaid labour, and 
intensified labour have characterised the 
period. Real wages, meanwhile, have been 
relatively stagnant in all advanced capitalist 
countries. Changes in the labour process 
and in the institutional and legal framework 
of employment, together with stagnant real 
wages, have contributed to a partial 
recovery of profitability after 1982.14
The second is the deregulation of financial 
markets, a process that commenced in the 
13 While briefly criticising Kondratieff’s long wave 
theory. 
14 For the path of profitability and the factors 
affecting it, see Dumenil and Levy (2005).
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late 1960s. Financial liberalisation initially 
involved measures to remove controls on 
interest rates and quantities of credit 
advanced by financial institutions, mostly 
banks in developed countries. Deregulation 
of the price and quantity of credit still 
remains the core of financial liberalisation. 
However, in the early 1970s the liberalisation 
trend also spread to developing countries, 
where it gradually assumed the character of 
a new development paradigm.
Once  se t  i n  mo t i on ,  f i n anc i a l 
liberalisation acquired a host of further 
characteristics, such as establishing and 
promoting capital markets, removing non-
competit ive practices among market 
brokers, channeling private savings to 
capital markets as pension and insurance 
funds, removing controls on international 
flows of loanable capital, promoting cross-
border operations of financial institution, 
and so on. In these complex ways financial 
deregulation became an integral element 
of the Washington Consensus that has 
dominated development thinking and 
macroeconomic policy since the late 
1980s.
In short ,  and speaking broadly, 
f inanc ia l isat ion is  the outcome of 
developments in the forces and relations of 
production coupled with changes in the 
institut ional and legal framework of 
accumulation. It represents a systemic 
transformation of the capitalist economy 
and as such i t  has had profound 
implications on social life. The full import of 
this transformation has emerged gradually, 
partly because the rhetoric and practice of 
neo-liberalism have directed attention to the 
general freeing of markets. But neo-
l iberal ism has acted as midwife of 
financialised capitalism.
3.  FINANCIALISATION AS ECONOMIC 
PROCESS
Financialisation, then, represents a shift 
in the balance between production and 
circulation that derives from changes in the 
forces and relations of production as well 
as in the institutional and legal context of 
accumulation. This section probes more 
deeply into the specific economic roots of 
financialisation, locating them in economic 
relations between industrial/commercial 
enterprises, financial institutions, and 
workers. As was discussed in section 1, the 
analytical approach adopted here derives 
from the classical Marxist debates on 
finance capital and imperialism. In the spirit 
of Hilferding’s analysis, the roots of 
financialisation are sought in the molecular 
relations between industry, banks and 
workers. 
3.1. Industrial capital and finance
The development of the world market 
during the last three decades presents two 
s ign i f i can t  t r ends ,  wh ich  appea r 
contradictory at first sight. On the one hand, 
compet i t ion has intensi f ied across 
deregulated global markets; on the other, 
the world economy has come to be 
dominated by multinational corporations 
(MNC). Thus, the period of financialisation 
represents an extremely high concentration 
of power in the hands of MNC in terms of 
world trade and foreign direct investment. 
15 However, the rise of MNC has not led to 
emergence of exclusive trading blocs, even 
though protectionism exists and is often 
directed against developing countries.
15 See Morera and Rojas (2009).
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Rather, competition in the world market 
appears to have intensif ied without 
monopolistic control over prices and 
quantities. New MNC have also emerged in 
developing countries, including Brazil, China, 
Korea, Malaysia and India. They have 
challenged established MNC from developed 
countries, often in the very markets of the 
latter, but also in new markets among 
developing countries. 16 This phenomenon is 
symptomatic of the gradual shift of 
productive capacity away from the 
established centres of industrial accumulation 
in the West and mostly toward Asia.
Financial isation has drawn on the 
changed f inancial requirements and 
practices of the dominant corporate 
enterprises, including MNC. Contrary to 
what Hilferding had postulated, large 
industrial corporations have become adept 
at financing their investment needs while 
relying less on banks. The primary 
mechanism is retention of own profits, as 
Sweezy (1942: p. 267) observed already in 
the early post-war decades. Several 
empirical studies bear this out at the 
aggregate level. 17 The reasons for this 
phenomenon are not entirely clear, but it 
probably has to do with the internal 
organisational structure of MNC as well as 
the types of technology that have prevailed 
in the post-war period.
For external finance, on the other hand, 
MNC have increasingly turned to open 
financial markets in bonds, stocks, and 
related instruments. The evidence of the 
last four or five decades leaves no room for 
doubt regarding secular trends across the 
main developed countries. 18 The most 
16 Recent trends are summarized in UNCTAD 
(2006).
17 See, for instance, Corbett and Jenkinson (1997).
18 For some relevant data see Lapavitsas (2009).
striking example is provided by Japanese 
corporations, which used to rely heavily on 
bank finance during the years of the post-
war boom but have increasingly diversified 
their financing toward open markets. The 
deeper reasons for this shift are again 
obscure, but they probably have to do with 
corporat ions f inding themselves in 
command of temporarily idle funds as their 
retained earnings have become significant. 
Inevitably corporations have sought flexible 
and profitable ways of lending these funds 
while by-passing financial intermediaries.
The changes in the financing requirements 
of large corporations have favoured the 
growth of markets in loanable capital in which 
corporations could enter as both lenders and 
borrowers. Flexibility and low cost make such 
markets attractive relative to banks, thus 
encouraging corporations to diversify their 
sources of funding toward markets. As the 
shift toward open markets has become 
better established, corporations have been 
able to develop skills in independent financial 
trading. Such skills typically include trade 
credit – in which corporations have always 
been heavily entangled – but also securities 
and foreign exchange trading.
Corporate financial skills have been 
important in the course of the successive 
waves of mergers and acquisitions during the 
last three decades. Despite obtaining small 
amounts of net investment finance from open 
markets, corporations have become heavily 
engaged in stock markets, issuing and 
acquiring equities. 19 Financial assets held by 
the corporate sector have increased 
substantially across developed countries. The 
importance of this phenomenon for 
financialisation cannot be overemphasised. In 
19 The trend is particularly clear in the USA, see Dos 
Santos (2009).
Financialisation, or the search for profits in the sphere of circulation
109
Ekonomiaz N.º 72, 3.er cuatrimestre, 2009
spite of greater independence from banks, 
industrial corporations have become more 
heavily implicated in financial activities. The 
modern MNC is ‘financialised’ in the sense 
that financial transactions are a substantial 
part of its activities and profit making.20
Finally, the spur given to financial markets 
by corporate participation has undermined 
financial regulations. ‘Regulatory arbitrage’ 
was prominent already in the 1960s and 
1970s as US and other corporations began 
to hold and trade loanable funds in 
‘Euromarkets’, that is, off-shore markets 
beyond the controls on price and quantity 
that existed at the time. This development 
prepared the ground for  f inanc ia l 
deregulation to proceed apace in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Thus, financial deregulation 
found ready-made terrain in spontaneous 
developments among industrial corporations 
and financial institutions.
To recap, using Hilferding’s and Lenin’s 
terminology, during the last three decades 
monopolistic capitals have become relatively 
more independent of banks, but also more 
heavily involved in financial transactions. 
They have become ‘financialised’ insofar as 
they have acquired functions that previously 
belonged to financial institutions. But they 
have also become more autonomous 
re lat ive to the sphere of  f inance. 
Monopol ist ic capi ta l  in  the era of 
financialisation is not dominated by banks.
3.2.  Financial institutions and workers’ 
revenue
These developments have had complex 
implications for commercial banks in the 
20 As was established for US corporations in the 
previously mentioned work by Krippner (2005).
major developed countries, leading to their 
gradual transformation. For one thing, 
profit-making opportunities for banks from 
lending to large corporations have shrunk 
as open markets grew. This lies at the core 
of ‘financial disintermediation’ that emerged 
as a major problem for banks in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  F inancia l  deregulat ion 
exacerbated pressure on banks by 
removing controls on interest rates. Bank 
deposits became more costly and, as open 
financial markets grew, ceased being a 
captive source of liquidity. Individual savings 
found several other outlets, for reasons 
discussed below. The end result was the 
end of tradit ional post-war f inancial 
intermediation in developed countries, that 
is, collecting secure deposits to make loans 
to industry and elsewhere.
Commercial banks have consequently 
sought other avenues of profit making, and 
in the process re-invented themselves. A 
variety of activities have been pursued, 
including mass lending to developing 
countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
foreign exchange dealing, money-dealing 
transactions across the world market, 
including remittances, and so on. However, 
two deve lopments s tand out  and 
characterise the era of financialisation: first, 
lending to individuals for mortgages and 
consumption; second, engaging in financial 
market mediat ion to earn fees and 
commissions as well as on own account 
(investment banking). Both have been 
instrumental to the bubble of 2001-7 and 
the subsequent crash. The former is briefly 
considered in this section, the latter in the 
next.
Credit for individual workers and others 
is not a new phenomenon, indeed 
pawnshops (and even formal institutions 
that lend to individuals) predate industrial 
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capitalism. But in the course of the 
twentieth century consumer lending and 
more complex financial operations involving 
personal income became a permanent 
fixture of formal finance. Financialisation 
since the late 1970s has witnessed a 
profound deepening of these phenomena. 
The personal revenue of workers and others 
has been ‘financialised’. This refers to 
borrowing, including loans for housing, 
general consumption, education, health, 
and so on. It also refers to financial assets, 
including (again) housing, pensions, 
insurance, money market funds, and so 
on.21
The prominence of individual borrowing 
is due to developments that connect 
financialisation to changes in production 
and the economy more generally. Above all, 
real wages have been effectively stagnant 
from the late 1970s onwards in several 
advanced capitalist countries. In that 
context,  consumpt ion has become 
increasingly mediated through finance. This 
phenomenon has turned postponement of 
payment for wage goods into an accepted 
social practice in several advanced 
countries. In effect, commodities in the 
wage basket have been increasingly 
consumed by discounting future wage 
earnings. The financial system has inserted 
itself in this process, extracting profits 
directly out of wages and salaries.
The re  i s ,  however ,  an  ev iden t 
cont rad ic t ion a t  the  core  o f  th is 
phenomenon: individual debt has been 
rising while real wages have been stagnant, 
making the wherewithal to val idate 
expanding personal credit ever more 
21 Relevant evidence for these trends can be found 
in the above-mentioned special issue of Historical 
Materialism. 
scarce. The implications are also clear. 
Given that the bulk of such borrowing has 
been for housing, ideal conditions have 
been created for real estate bubbles across 
the developed (and sometimes the 
developing) world. Mortgage loans seem 
validated for short periods of time by rising 
house prices, but that is mostly due to easy 
provision of housing loans. The crash 
inevitably comes when real wages prove 
incapable of sustaining interest and 
repayments of rising loans. This is in a 
nutshell what took place in the USA in 
2001-7, but also in several other countries 
during the last three decades.
At the same time, and as part of the neo-
liberal agenda, there has been gradual 
withdrawal of public provision from several 
fields that relate directly to the circulation of 
the income of workers and others. Retreat 
of public provision has been vital in housing, 
which forms the large bulk of consumer 
debt. Meanwhile, private homeownership – 
as opposed to public housing or renting – 
has been promoted as a mechanism of 
social binding in the USA, the UK and 
elsewhere. But public provision has also 
retreated in health, education, transport, 
and so on. Private arrangements have been 
put in place to deal with these social needs. 
Hence, private finance has found new 
scope to engage in lending. In effect, the 
circulation of workers’ revenue has become 
more strongly privatised, while being 
increasingly mediated by private finance. 
Withdrawal of public provision has fostered 
the ‘financialisation’ of the individual, 
encouraging the emergence of private 
finance as a mechanism dealing with a 
range of social needs.
However, worker revenues have also 
been financialised with regard to assets. To 
an extent, the growth of individual financial 
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assets is merely an automatic result of 
turning housing into a financial asset – by far 
the largest asset possessed by workers. 
Nonetheless, the financialisation of housing 
has had deleterious effects on the 
expenditure of worker income. As liability, 
housing creates fixed obligations through 
mortgage debt, but as asset its value varies 
according to the vagaries of the housing 
market. This has been a significant aspect of 
the bubbles characteristic of financialisation. 
In the course of a housing boom, the net 
financial wealth of household appears to rise, 
further boosting consumption; when a 
housing bubble burst, the reverse occurs, 
limiting consumption.
The growth of individual financial assets is 
also due to developments associated with 
the retreat of public provision and neo-liberal 
policy in general. Pension provision is the 
main element of saving for workers and 
others, particularly as lifespan has lengthened 
in developed countries. The withdrawal of 
the state from pension provision has created 
room for private mediation, primarily through 
pens ion funds.  Neo- l ibera l  po l icy, 
furthermore, has actively encouraged the 
flow of personal savings into pension funds, 
but also insurance companies and a host of 
other intermediaries operating in open 
financial markets. Thus, regulation 401K in 
the USA and a range of similar measures in 
the UK has actively diverted personal savings 
into the realm of private financial capital. For 
commercial and investment banks, this 
presented further opportunities for profit 
making through mediating open market 
transactions. In short, investment banking 
functions were encouraged, as is shown in 
more detail below.
The rising importance of worker revenue 
in the operations of banks signifies major 
changes in prof i t  making that are 
characteristic of financialisation. In line with 
classical political economy, Marxist theory 
analyses bank profits as deriving typically 
from handling the monetary transactions of 
enterprises (earning the average rate of 
profit) as well as from lending to enterprises 
(earning interest, a part of surplus value). 
Bank profits that derive from mediating the 
circuits of worker revenues (whether as 
liabilities or assets) constitute a new source 
of profits. Such financial profits are rooted 
in the sphere of circulation and derive 
directly from wages and salaries. This 
process has elsewhere been called financial 
expropriation.22
Financial expropriation has exploitative 
aspects deriving from systematic differences 
between financial institutions and workers 
in terms of information availability, economic 
and social power, and alternatives in 
undertaking transactions. On the one hand, 
workers have been increasingly forced into 
the arms of private finance as public 
provision of key wage goods has retreated. 
Financial profits have been generated out of 
wage income in ways reminiscent of the 
practice of trucking, except that this now 
happens on a social scale and the profits 
accrue to financial institutions, not to the 
providers of wage goods. On the other 
hand, financial profits have also been 
generated out of wage income through 
predatory lending and other forms of over-
charging through fees and commissions. 
These practices are reminiscent of the age-
old tradition of usury, but they are now 
performed by the formal financial system.
Financial expropriation represents the 
generalisation on a social scale of financial 
22 See Lapavitsas (2009). See also Dymski (2009) 
and Dos Santos (2009) for further analysis of the 
exploitative content of individual lending.
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practices that resemble trucking and usury. 
It has allowed financial institutions to boost 
their profits independently of surplus value 
generated by the indifferently performing 
sphere of production. This is a constituent 
element of financialisation.
3.3.  Financial market mediation and 
the growth of investment banking
The second trend characteristic of the 
transformation of banks in the course of 
financialisation is the turn toward financial 
market mediation. Banks have aimed at 
earning fees and commissions but also at 
making profits through trading on own 
account. These are essentially investment 
banking functions. Combined with the turn 
of banks toward workers’ revenue, they have 
been a prime cause of the crisis of 2007-9. 
Lending to individuals, even for housing, 
could never have generated a global 
capitalist crisis by itself, as is apparent from 
the relatively small size of the US subprime 
market compared to the mortgage market 
as a whole, and even more compared to the 
US financial system. But when lending to 
individuals was combined with the growth of 
investment banking, it proved capable of 
triggering a major recession.
The acquisition of investment banking 
practices is partly a reaction of banks to the 
growth of open financial markets. Such 
markets are the natural terrain of investment 
banking, i.e., banking that borrows short in 
wholesale money markets to invest in 
securities, thus earning profits through fees, 
commissions and proprietary trading. 23 
23 Investment banking profits are a theoretical 
problem for Marxist political economy. Hilferding (1981) 
argued that they originate in ‘founder’s profit’, which is 
future profit of enterprise accruing as lump sum. This is 
Profits from these sources, above all, 
proprietary trading, were instrumental to 
bank profitability during the bubble of 2001-
7. The rise of these banking activities has 
been notable since the late 1970s; it 
accelerated in the 1980s; and it was given 
formal status with the abolition of the Glass-
Steagall Act in the USA in 1999 and similar 
legislation elsewhere.
The turn of banks toward financial market 
med ia t i on  i s  r e l a t ed  to  b roade r 
developments, discussed above. First, the 
rise of monopolistic capitals in the form of 
MNC has encouraged repeated bouts of 
mergers and acquisitions. Monopoly capital 
might not have sought significant finance 
for investment in capital markets, but it has 
certainly turned to them to foster the 
centralisation of capital. The ideology of 
‘shareholder value’ also seems to have 
affected the behavior of industr ia l/
commercial corporations, forcing them to 
organise activities with an eye of stock 
market returns. The prol i ferat ion of 
leveraged buy-outs, takeovers, share buy-
backs and the like has provided natural 
terrain for growth of investment banking. 
Second, the channeling of personal savings 
toward capital markets (as public provision 
has retreated) created scope for investment 
banks to intervene in transact ions 
associated with pension funds, insurance 
companies, and so on. Third, floating 
exchange rates and volatile interest rates 
have contributed to expansion of derivative 
markets. Investment banking has found 
room for proprietary trading in these 
markets, including financial engineering.
Securitisation of mortages and other 
assets represents a combination of 
not persuasive and it is better to treat ‘founder’s profit’ 
as a share of the loanable capital traded.
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commercial with investment banking. In a 
nutshell, long-term assets are transformed 
into (presumably) liquid securities that are 
then taken of f  the balance sheet. 
Meanwhile, liabilities are shifted toward 
borrowing in wholesale money markets, 
diluting the importance of deposits. Capital 
adequacy is effectively reduced – despite 
regulations – through ‘churning’ capital to 
create off-balance sheet items, the final 
responsibility for which still lies with the 
bank. US and UK banks took the lead in 
expanding this process, while continuing to 
engage in standard commercial banking 
activities of deposit collection and lending 
to a variety of borrowers. Thus, commercial 
banks have continued to acts as financial 
intermediaries but acquired a strong 
admixture of the investment banker. The 
combination eventually resulted in the 
effective bankruptcy of a broad swathe of 
commercial banks across developed 
countries.
One reason for the eventual disaster was 
that, as commercial and investment banking 
functions were combined, tensions were 
generated between solvency and liquidity. 
All banks are obliged to walk a tightrope 
between liquidity and solvency, since they 
borrow short to lend long. However, things 
differ significantly between commercial and 
investment banks. Commercial bank 
liquidity typically originates in deposits, and 
is held as secure, tradable assets to meet 
withdrawal pressure on money-l ike 
deposits. In contrast, investment bank 
liquidity originates in wholesale markets, 
and is not subject to demands from money-
like deposits. Solvency, on the other hand, 
requires all banks to hold sufficient own 
capital. This is typically lower for investment 
banks, partly because they act as brokers, 
and partly because commercial bank capital 
adequacy is closely regulated to protect 
their monetary functions.
When commercial banks engage in 
securities trading – be that to earn fees or 
on own account – they typically seek 
wholesale l iquidi ty to f inance their 
operations. If the securities acquired prove 
problematic (as was the case with 
mortgage-backed securities) wholesale 
liquidity could dry up, potentially creating 
shortages in meeting deposit withdrawal 
requirements. The spectre of a bank run is 
always present. If, at the same time, banks 
have effectively reduced capital adequacy 
along investment banking lines (by moving 
assets off-balance sheet but still having 
ultimate responsibility for them) liquidity 
shortages due to poor securities could 
become a solvency problem. For those 
commercial banks that cannot easily 
recapitalise and obtain fresh liquidity the 
outcome is bankruptcy. This was, in short, 
the predicament of a host of large 
commercial banks across developed 
countries in 2008-9.
A further reason why combining 
commercial and investment functions has 
proven so damaging in the current crisis is 
the impact of the information-gathering 
practices of commercial banks, leading to 
changes in r isk management.  The 
information costs of lending to large 
numbers of individuals are of a different 
order to magnitude to those of lending to 
enterprises. Consequently, the turn toward 
personal income on a mass scale would 
have been impossib le wi thout the 
technological revolution in information and 
telecommunications. Thus, banks have 
acquired ways of managing the risks 
attached to housing and consumer loan 
through ‘credit scoring’ and the associated 
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statistical manipulation of its results. 24 This 
is a clear instance of the development of 
the forces of production favouring the 
asymmetric growth of finance in recent 
years.
But technological change has had further 
profound effects as investment banking 
activities spread. For, commercial banks 
have gradual ly adopted essent ia l ly 
investment banking techniques in managing 
credit risk as well as their balance sheets in 
genera l .  Computat iona l l y - in tens ive 
statistically-based techniques have come to 
dominate the management of Value at Risk. 
These are necessarily related to mark-to-
market accounting. And they have been 
fostered through the global imposition of 
BIS requirements on capital adequacy.
The overall outcome has been that 
commercial banks have become even more 
‘arms-length’ from corporations and 
borrowers in general. Banks appear to have 
lost some ability to collect information 
through personal visits, by placing bank 
employees within corporation structures, by 
managing corporate accounts and 
monetary transactions, and so on. These 
‘relational’ methods have traditionally been 
fundamental to banks’ ability to assess 
borrower risk. But banks have gradually 
replaced them with ‘hard’ techniques of 
information collection and risk management 
that draw on computationally intensive 
statistical methods.
The result has been far from happy, as 
the current crisis testifies. As ‘relational’ risk 
management declined, the banking system 
as a whole seems to have experienced a 
net loss of capacity to assess r isk 
altogether. This has been exacerbated by 
24 See Lapavitsas and Dos Santos (2008).
the subcontracting of due diligence on 
loans to other institutions within the financial 
system, with the final result that mortgage-
backed securit ies were not properly 
assessed by anyone. These developments 
pose profound questions regarding the 
future of banking in financialised capitalist 
economies. If commercial banks are less 
important to large corporations as providers 
of funds, if they grossly mishandle and 
exploit lending to individuals, and if they are 
bad at managing risk, what is their future 
role?
4. CONCLUSION
Financialisation is a complex social and 
economic process that has emerged 
gradually in the course of the last three 
decades. The sphere of circulation has 
shown considerably more dynamism than 
the sphere of production. At one remove, 
this reflects the continuing difficulties that 
production has faced during the period, 
resulting in uncertain productivity growth 
and problematic profitability. At a further 
remove, it is the outcome of deregulation 
across the financial sector and the labour 
market. Consequently, new sources of 
profitability have been sought in the sphere 
of circulation, above all, in finance. This is a 
distinguishing feature of financialisation as a 
period of capitalist development.
Using a political economy framework 
based on Hilferding’s Marxist analysis, this 
paper has further shown that financialisation 
has originated in changing relations 
between industrial/commercial capital, 
banks and workers. Specifically, industrial 
and commercial corporate enterprises have 
become less reliant on banks for loans, 
while engaging in independent financial 
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transactions in open markets. As a result, 
banks were forced to alter their operations, 
above all, by turning toward individual 
income as a source of profits, and by 
adopting investment banking practices in 
open markets. Meanwhile, workers have 
been forced into the arms of the financial 
system through withdrawal of public 
provision across a range of wage goods as 
well as through legislative change over 
pensions and other forms of saving. The 
result has been financial expropriation, that 
is, the extraction of financial profit directly 
out of wages and salaries. The combination 
of financial expropriation and investment 
banking has led to the current crisis.
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